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AN AMERICA'S CUP FOR TORT
REFORM? AUSTRALIA AND
AMERICA COMPARED
Jeffrey O'Connell* and David Partlett**

The issue of tort reform has descended from Ivory Towers to
populist politics. A few years ago no one could have predicted
that "tort reform" would become political argot and a stirring
election slogan. Some in the United States see the tort crisis and
the stimulus for reform as somehow uniquely American. 1 This
Article shows instead that many advanced, industrialized societies are discussing tort reform initiatives actively. The precise
nature of the problems, the reasons for reform, and the shape of
solutions will be fashioned by indigenous culture, tradition, and
the uncertainties of politics. In the common-law world, however,
a number of countries are sufficiently similar to provide valuable
mutual lessons.
The importance of tort reform suggests that decision makers
take a wider, comparative viewpoint. Through comparison, we
may better understanq our own dilemmas and the reasons for
them. Moreover, the operation of reforms in other common-law
countries may be transplanted successfully to the United States.
This Article addresses those people, primarily in the United
States and Australia, who are interested in these matters of legal
change. Both countries can learn lessons that may aid in the
choice of appropriate roads to reform. 2
• John Allan Love Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A.,
Dartmouth College, 1951; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1954.
•• Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. LL.B, University of Sydney, 1971; LL.M., University of Michigan, 1974; S.J.D., University of Virginia, 1980.
Thanks are to Eric Szweda, Class of 1990, for research assistance.
1. See Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J.
1521 (1987) [hereinafter Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis]; Priest, The Monsanto
Lectures: Modern Tort Law and its Reform, 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 1 (1987); Priest, Puzzles
of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 497 (1987). But cf. Little, Up With Torts, 24 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 861 (1987) (urging reformers to have regard for English law and
experience).
2. Some valuable work has appeared exposing Australian developments for American
audiences. See DeMott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, 65 WASH.
U.L.Q. 69 (1987); Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1987);
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Part I describes the forces in tort law that have resulted in
calls for reform. Different types of reforms have emerged, and
foreign reforms vary. We argue that those most worthy of examination have been developed in countries with similar political
and legal traditions. The initiatives, wrong turns, and failings of
American and Australian lawmakers should be of particular mutual interest. The formulation of a catalog of goals is an essential
task in thinking about reform. 3
Part II provides an introduction to Australian endeavors. We
seek to explain both the willingness of Australia to consider farreaching reform and the reasons why the Australian reform has,
in its implementation, disappointed expectations. The reforms
now adopted in the states of Victoria, South Australia, and,
most recently, New South Wales are closely examined. The New
South Wales reforms are particularly noteworthy, because the
legislatiqn enacted against a background of recommendations by
the New South Wales Law Reform Commission set forth a wellreasoned and vigorous case for abolition of the common law and
replacement by a state-organized compensation scheme.
Part III proposes a positive program for reform. Considering
political and theoretical objections to, on the one hand, statist
reform and, on the other, ad hoc and piecemeal change, we present an elective no-fault scheme that borrows from both contractual and legislative guises. This suggestion builds on a body of
scholarship and practical reforms propounded by the senior author." Part III tests the adaptability of elective no-fault to the
Australian context. We conclude that these elective no-fault
schemes fit comfortably and have a number of advantages over
the currently existing common-law situation and over other proposed reforms.
In the end, we hope to convey to the reader the value of a
wider vantage point in the present tort debate. Comparative
work tempered by an appreciation of differences in social and
Levin, Equal Educational Opportunity for Children with Special Needs: The Federal
Role in Australia, 48 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1985, at 213.
3. See Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 603
(1973) (setting forth desiderata of a compensation scheme); infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., O'Connell, A Neo No-Fault Contract In Lieu of Tort: Preaccident_ Guar·
antees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898 (1985); O'Connell, An
Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No Fault Insurance for Many Kinds
of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501 (1976) [hereinafter O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability].
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political conditions may well lead us to make more informed,
balanced, and humane decisions in restructuring tort law. 11

I.

COMMON LAW TORT REFORM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The law of torts has changed remarkably over the last thirtyfive years. From a narrow, private law focus, tort law has
achieved high public and political profile. With this have come
calls for reform, sometimes grafted upon the extant law, and at
other times, demands for more radical schemes. Appropriate reform requires a careful articulation of the goals of that reform,
strengthened by an appreciation of the relevant overseas
experiments.
A.

The Challenge and Pattern of Tort Reform

Torts scholars should be resting uneasily in their beds. Tort
law is complex and exciting and, at the same time, perplexing
and worrying. The potency of the law of negligence has induced
tort liability to protect new interests: the law of torts has invaded the domain of contract law. 6 The overt instrumental goals
5.

Markesinis, An Expanding Tort Law-The Price of a Rigid Contract Law, 103

LAW

Q. REV. 354, 396 (1987) (a "cri de coeur" on the "practical and theoretical [need] to

apply the method of exegesis and comparison to relatively narrow and manageable
problems"); Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 LAW Q. REV. 79 (1976) (discussing comparative law technique). One commentator has remarked:
The high rate of social change prevalent or aimed at in nearly all contemporary
societies seriously challenges the skills and abilities of statesmen, lawyers and
social scientists . . . . This is one of the more significant areas where the comparative social study of law can make a significant contribution to the solution of
social problems.
Dror, Law and Social Change, 33 TuL. L. REV. 787, 802 (1959). The law of torts is a
product of complex legal, social, historical, and economic factors. See ABA SPECIAL
COMM. ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW (1984);
Whitman, A "Humanitarian" Approach to Individual Injury, 79 MICH. L. REv. 762
(1981). For a view on the political dimension of tort law, see Zacharias, The Politics of
Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698 (1986).
6. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). For judicial concern that contract law should not "drown in a sea of tort," see East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866, 871 (1986). See also Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Infl.icted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985) (describing the boundaries and rationale of tort recovery); Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic
Loss, and the Privity Requirement: Once More Into the Void, 67 B.U.L. REV. 9 (1987). In
Australia, the seminal High Court decision is Caltex Oil Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 136 C.L.R. 529 (Aust!. 1976).
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in tort law encourage courts to grant compensation on a wide
scale by way of third-party liability insurance to the victims of
accidents and misfortunes. 7 Mass and toxic tort litigation involve occurrences far beyond the original focus of the
law-namely, simple interaction between two, or at least among
very few, parties. This expansion in the scope of tort law by itself significantly weakens any argument that tort law is merely
private law. 8 In truth, tort law has thrown off any pretense that
it is purely a regime of private law and has been revealed as
public law. In other words, most scholars regard tort law, on the
whole, as a form of public regulation. Professionals' conduct, for
example, is molded not only by extensive regulatory licensing,
but also by common-law tort liability rules. 9 Also, industry must
try to conform its practices to the discipline of products liability
law in addition to that of complex regulatory regimes. 10
Although the public-law face of tort law has not always been
apparent, it has been present since the Industrial Revolution
made human lives more interdependent. Nineteenth century
courts saw that liability rules attaching to workers and their employers influenced the cost of production. Whether one accepts
or rejects the thesis that the defenses of common employment,
contributory negligence, and voluntary assumption of risk subsidized the growth of industry, liability rules undoubtedly imposed costs. 11 This development revealed the public character of
liability in the industrial setting, which in turn facilitated the
7. For insightful discussions, see G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY (1980); Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
8. See J. THOMPSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL THEORY 224
(W. Parent ed. 1986); Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The
Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 883-906 (1987); Rosenberg, The

Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System,
HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984). But see Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A Reassessment of Current Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765 (1987) (suggesting
that tort law exists primarily to resolve disputes); Weinrib, The Insurance Justification
and Private Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 681, 686 (1985) (arguing that tort law continues to
have coherence only from the viewpoint of corrective justice). See generally McGovern,
Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REv.
97

440 (1986) (analyzing new case management techniques).
9. See D. PARTLETT, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE (1985).
10. See Reuter, Designing Safer Products: Corporate Responses to Product Liability
Law and Regulation, 7 J. PROD. LtAB. 263 (1984). For a discussion of the comparative
efficacy of liability rules and regulation, see Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984).
11. See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). But cf.
Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981); Note, Private Law and Public Policy: Negligence Law
and Political Change in Nineteenth-Century North Carolina, 66 N.C.L. REV. 421 (1988).
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subsequent enactment of workers' compensation no-fault legislation throughout the Western world. 12 Some observers at the time
perceived this public character in other areas of tort law and
reasoned that the no-fault pattern would find acceptance for accidents generally. 13 Large tracts of tort law, however, continued
to possess a private-law appearance.
The history of the reform of tort law has been punctuated
with reforms-some accepted, others rejected-where various
spheres of the law's operation were seen as possessing sufficient
public character to call for public regulation. For example, injuries arising out of the operation of motor vehicles came to be
regarded as not merely a matter for vindication of rights between individuals. The use of motor vehicles caused many accidents and required compensation, quite apart from tort law, for
accident victims. The magnitude of the problem required recognition of its public character and eventuated in a public resolution in favor of no-fault legislation. 14
Present day tort scholars are condemned to restless nights because the judicial muscle and imagination that expanded liability to govern technological risks also has exposed a serious public policy nerve. From a public policy viewpoint, we must ask
whether the multifaceted judicial task can reach prompt, adequate, and acceptable conclusions. More concretely, the courts
applying the law of torts pursue diverse goals of compensation
and deterrence, goals accomplished in an individualized and
haphazard way. 1 ~ Attorneys represent individuals, or classes of
individuals, in adversarial proceedings generating both considerable costs and unreliable information upon which courts must
ground their conclusions. Juries, if matters go that far, balance
the costs and benefits crudely. Issues of product design and
technological risk seem inappropriate for a common-law system
designed at its inception for the resolution of more mundane accident interactions. 16 In economic terms, the error costs of the
12. See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916); J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF
TORTS 495-97 (7th ed. 1987); see also Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic
Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775 (1982).
13. See Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235 (1914).
14. U.S.- DEP'T OF TRANSP., MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LOSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 94-100, 128-32, 138-39, 143-46 (1971).
15. See Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North
American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 929 (1987) (pointing to the impossibility of the tort system's performing
the tasks of promoting socially optimal insurance (compensation) and deterrence objectives simultaneously).
16. See J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES, INSURANCE, AND INJUSTICE 97-105 (1986); Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
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common-law system are inordinate. 17 The adaptability of the
common law to even approach within cannon shot the resolution
of modern day tort problems speaks volumes for its strengths.
But the common-law approach is like the panda's thumb: it performs tasks but does so inefficiently. If we could design a panda,
we might give it a more useful thumb. 18 Because we have some
power to design tort liability rules, we should attempt to formulate and establish a more efficient system. 19
Reform suggestions have come in different forms. The most
recent suggestion attempts to ameliorate the symptoms of the
malfunctioning tort system. 20 We may refer to this approach as
the "ad hoc" phenomenon. This new wave of tort reform proposals reacts to costly or unavailable insurance. This reform limits
levels of damages, proscribes punitive damages, modifies rules of
contribution between tortfeasors and collateral benefits, and regulates contingency fees. 21 These reforms are designed to reduce
the level of tort litigation and hence minimize exposure of persons to tort liability. The widespread acceptance of this type of
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 CoLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973); Huber, Safety and
the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 277 (1985).
17. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1139, 1148
(1987); Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799, 806-13
(1983).
18. The metaphor comes from Elliot, Managerial Judging in the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 306, 306-07 (1986).
19. See Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. Cm. L.
REV. 184 (1987) (giving perspectives on initiatives).
20. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
MEDICAL LIABILITY AND MALPRACTICE 121-35 (1987); U.S. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP,
REPORT ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986); O'Connell, A Correct Diagnosis of the

Ills of Liability Insurance as a False Cure: A Comment on the Reports of the Federal
Tort Policy Working Group, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 161 (1988); Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis, supra note 1.
21. For example, the recent Alabama reform included: Act of June 11, 1987, No. 183,
§ 3, 1987 Ala. Acts 245, 245 (codified at ALA. CODE § 6-11-3 (Supp. 1988)) (authorizing
periodic payments in civil actions that result in damage awards); Act of June 11, 1987,
No. 184, §§ 1-4, 6, 1987 Ala. Acts 249, 249 (codified at ALA. CoDE § 12-21-12 (Supp.
1988)) (abolishing "scintilla" rule and instead requiring that "substantial evidence" shall
be the burden of proof in civil law suits); Act of June 11, 1987, No. 185, §§ 1-2, 8, 1987
Ala. Acts 251, 251 (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 6-11-20, -21, -27 (Supp. 1988)) (requiring
that punitive damages may be awarded only where clear and convincing evidence is
proved and providing for a cap on such damages; limiting liability of principal for punitive damages for acts committed by agent); Act of June 11, 1987, No. 186, §§ 1-4, 1987
Ala. Acts 254, 254 (codified at ALA. CODE§§ 12-19-270 to -273 (Supp. 1988)) (authorizing
courts to assess court costs and attorneys' fees in frivolous civil actions); see also FLORIDA'S ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS, FINAL
RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF 1988 (1988) [hereinafter FLORIDA'S
TASK FORCE, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT].
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reform attests to its political appeal. Such reform gives a legislature the appearance of responding to a crisis by virtue of its individual rhetorical appeal, yet in fact leaves the common law a
little enfeebled. On closer examination, this legislation works unfairly to the advantage of the powerful groups recommending it
and, more importantly, may adversely affect those who most deserve and need compensation. 22 It may also significantly undermine the deterrence function of the law. 23
A second type of tort law reform manifests itself as a type of
pressure valve. This reform provides for a compensation scheme
under which victims of accidents falling within certain classes
are compensated on a no-fault basis. Common-law liability is
left in place. 24 The efficacy of this reform has been tested in the
area of industrial accidents in England and Australia. In both
England and Australia, a worker injured in the course of his employment may obtain no-fault benefits under workers' compensation legislation and also sue the employer for common-law
damages. Particularly in Australia, where the laws are more generous in granting workers' compensation benefits than in England, the courts have been conservative in expanding the scope
of common-law liability. 211 This development contrasts starkly
with motor vehicle cases where proof of fault has become highly
attenuated over the years. More recent suggestions for reform in
22. J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, supra note 16, at 97-105; see Wade, An Evaluation of
the "Insurance Crisis" and Existing Tort Law, 24 Hous. L. REV. 81 (1987); see also Fein
v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 167-78, 695 P.2d 665, 687-95, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 390-97 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
23. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 154-57 (1986). Abolishing the collateral source rule may allow the potential tortfeasor to avoid the full cost of his negligent
actions, and hence negligent actions will be engaged in at a greater than optimal level.
For criticism of the rule, see Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Contract Damages, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 56 (1986).
24. For a discussion of add-on, no-fault auto laws and the (expensive) experience
under them, see O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and NoFault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REV. 61 (1986). For more on the comparative expansion of
first party coverage payable without reference to fault and the effect of no-fault insurance on tort liability claims, see O'Connell & Baker, Compensation for Injury & Illness:
An Update of the Conard-Morgan Tabulations, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 913 (1986); O'Connell &
Guinivan, An Irrational Combination: The Relative Expansion of Liability Insurance
and Continuation of Loss Insurance, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. (1988) (forthcoming).
25. Atiyah, Res lpsa Loquitur in England and Australia, 35 Moo. L. REV. 337 (1972)
(contrasting the strict Australian view of res ipsa loquitur with the English view). English courts have more willingly relaxed the rigors of this system because of the relatively
lower no-fault benefit obtainable under the applicable workers' compensation. See McGhee v. National Coal Bd., (1972) 3 All E.R. 1008 (H.L.) (adopting a probabilistic causation model). But c.f. Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health Auth., (1987] 1 App. Cas. 750
(H.L.) (division among their Lordships on probabilistic causation as it applies to a loss of
chance).
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this area attempt to build mechanisms to encourage resort to the
compensation fund rather than to the exercise of the right to sue
at common law. 26 These schemes refine the add-on, no-fault automobile schemes that were created in the late sixties and early
seventies throughout much of the common-law world. 27
A third variation recognizes the dominant public law character
of tort and, to a greater or lesser extent, substitutes a right to
recover against a public fund for the claim in tort. The apotheosis of this reform is the New Zealand National Compensation
Scheme, which expunges the right to claim at common law for
personal injury and, in lieu thereof, creates a right to obtain nofault compensation from a state-administered fund. 28 This
scheme broadens the availability of compensation to victims of
accidents, abandoning the so-called "forensic lottery." At the
same time, the scheme reduces the cost of receiving compensation. No provision is made for full common-law compensation.
In keeping with a socially administered scheme, the level of economic losses is restricted, and, with limited exceptions,
noneconomic losses-pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of
life-are excluded.
Note that, in a measure, this reform maintains its tort link by
basing compensation payments on lost income, though it imposes a cap. This places the reform at odds with the conception
of a social welfare scheme based upon needs and reflects a fear
that significant deterrence through internalization of the costs of
accidents is lost once the link between action and extent of injury is broken. The third party insurance heritage may also be
perceived. The well-paid, who pose the greatest actuarial risk to
the fund, pay the same premium as the less wealthy. In this way,
the poor subsidize the wealthy. The scheme also reflects its torts
roots by compensating for accidents. Critics point out that a
26. Feinberg, The Toxic Tort Litigation Crisis: Conceptual Problems and Proposed
Solutions, 24 Hous. L. REV. 155, 167-74 (1987) (discussing reforms that would encourage
out-of-court settlement). The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 201, 300aa to 300aa-33), provides
no-fault compensation for economic losses and sets a maximum of $250,000 for pain and
suffering. Payments are made out of a government-sponsored compensation fund. A
plaintiff seeking vindication under common law faces a defense· that the vaccine was
accompanied' by an adequate warning complying with FDA regulations.
27. See O'Connell & Joost, supra note 24; see also the former Victorian add-on auto
no-fault scheme, Motor Accidents Act, 1973 Viet. Acts 8429.
28. For a description of the New Zealand Accident Compensation Act of 1972, see G.
PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY 63-130 (1979). The legislation followed the report, ROYAL COMMISSION TO INQUIRE INTO AND REPORT UPON WORKERS' COMPENSATION
(1967). For criticism, see Henderson, The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform,
48 U. Cm. L. REV. 781 (1981).
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compensation scheme should not only include victims of accidents but also victims of illness and other misfortunes. A recent
monumental English study shows that illness rather than accidents accounts for most of the personal economic dislocation
arising from disabilities. 29
The menu of possible reforms does not end here. Elective nofault has been proposed that could be implemented with or
without legislative intervention. 30 This scheme builds upon the
second type of reform identified above. For present purposes, it
is enough to note that this reform leaves the common law in
place but forecloses or limits resort to it in the event that timely
no-fault compensation is offered. This reform, with its emphasis
upon individual choice making, has distinct advantages. These
advantages over other suggested reforms are both theoretical
and, in terms of political acceptability, practical.

B.

The Dilemma of Choice

A smorgasbord is arrayed before those concerned with questions of tort reform. We may select dishes ranging from modest
tinkering to complete overthrow. The difficulty of choosing and
then implementing reform should not be underestimated. Although the Rand Corporation, among others, has contributed
valuable work, a thorough knowledge of the dimensions of the
problem is still a distant goal. 31 Even as new dimensions of the
problem are revealed, the reformer must guard against nirvana
29. D. HARRIS, M. MACLEAN, H. GENN, S. LLOYD-BOSTOCK, P. FENN, P. CoRFIELD & Y.
BRITTAN, COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY (1984). For a proposed
American study along the same lines, see 52 Fed. Reg. 27,724 (1987). The grant for the
study has been made to the Rand Corporation. See generally J. STAPLETON, DISEASE AND
THE COMPENSATION DEBATE 142-57 (1986) (criticizing the arbitrariness of the common law
in stopping short of compensating for misfortunes beyond those arising from accidents);
Abel, The Real Tort Crisis: Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443 (1987) -(arguing that
the tort system fails to compensate needy victims); Abraham, Principle and Pragmatism
in the Compensation Debate, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 302 (1987) (criticizing Stapleton).
For more on this fundamental debate, see COMMONWEALTH OF AusTL., ATTORNEY GEN.'s
DEP'T, PERSONAL COMPENSATION FOR INJURY: PROCEEDINGS OF A SEMINAR 93-118 (J. Davis
& D. Partlett eds.) (Australian National University, Aug. 17-19, 1985) [hereinafter PERSONAL COMPENSATION FOR INJURY).
30. See infra notes 143-82 and accompanying text.
31. For a review of the work of the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice, see
THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST SEVEN PROGRAM YEARS:
APRIL 1980 - MARCH 1987 (1987); see also U.S. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MAL·
PRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984 (1987). A useful state survey is
FLORIDA'S TASK FORCE, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT, supra note 21. For one attempt
to use the available data systematically, see Priest, supra note 7.
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fallacy. 32 The real world of torts with all its warts cannot be
compared with the idealized reformed world. 33 Reformers must
therefore meet a considerable burden of predicting the cost that
may be generated by their reforms. The greater the degree of
reform, the more difficult prediction becomes. Reformers must
also be aware of political stumbling blocks to change. Here,
again, the more significant the reform, the greater the resistance.
Powerful constituencies contend: insurers, industries, labor unions, the welfare lobby, and lawyers. They speak strongly and
form disparate viewpoints in the political fora. One may expect
reform, then, to resemble a crazy quilt of compromise as it
emerges from this Babel.
This dilemma should leave reformers to somber reflection. In
particular, we regard as an essential starting point the articulation of objectives of any reform. Fifteen years ago, Professor
(now Judge) Robert Keeton recognized the desirability of generalized objectives that a "good compensation system might
serve." 34 He saw that a consequence would be to "identify consensus. " 36 It seems useful then to list the desiderata of any system that may attract a fair degree of consensus, and then to
measure reform proposals against those desiderata. The objectives proposed by Keeton, in our opinion, form a useful starting
point.
First, a good system of compensation will be equitable,
and it will be so from each of three different perspectives-between those who receive its benefits and those
who bear the burden of its costs, among different beneficiaries, and among different cost-bearers.
Second, the system will contribute to the protection,
enhancement, and wise allocation of society's human and
economic resources.
Third, the system will compensate promptly. It will
meet economic burdens as they occur, and it will provide
for medical and other rehabilitative services as they are
needed.
32. Cf. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1272
(1982) (providing a similar warning in respect to corporate law regulation).
33. One should be aware of the tendentious quality of the debate on both sides. Reports favoring change avoid possible pitfalls of reform, and those espousing the status
quo often turn a blind eye to present shortcomings. The conservative presumption of
maintaining the status quo with its known costs has considerable power when the costs
of adjustment to change are considered.
34. Keeton, supra note 3, at 600.
35. Id. at 602.
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Fourth, the system will be reliable. It will give assurance of financial responsibility for the payment of compensation determined to be due, and the determinations
of entitlement to benefits and responsibility for costs will
be predictable.
Fifth, the system will distribute losses rather than impose or leave crushing burdens on individuals.
Sixth, the system will be efficient, minimizing waste
and overhead.
Seventh, the system will avoid inducements and, if feasible, provide affirmative deterrents to antisocially risky
conduct.
Eighth, the system will minimize inducements to exaggeration and fraud and opportunities for profit from such
conduct. This is essential to the integrity and equity of
the system and to cost control as well. 36
With this template for consideration of reform proposals, by
what means may reformers reach a conclusion on each of the
eight grounds? 37 A significant scholarly tradition on this point
has grown in the United States. Theoretical and empirical work
has enriched our appreciation of the issues. 38 This Article suggests that an instructive source for reformers in the United
States is found in initiatives adopted and proposed in differing
legal systems.

C. Foreign Patterns of Reform
We have already mentioned the New Zealand reform and
some proposed expansions upon it. As momentum for reform
gathers, we expect that other models may also be usefully examined.39 Such work must account for the dangers as well as the
benefits of comparative work. Models adopted elsewhere may ill
36. Id. at 603.
37. We are inclined to assure the reader that the coincidence of the number eight
with the Buddha's eightfold path does not clothe the aims with any transcendental qualities beyond their own merit. For an introductory discussion of the Buddha's eightfold
path, see G. PARRINDER, A DICTIONARY OF NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIONS 204 (2d ed. 1981).
38. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COMPENSATING AUTO ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FoLLOW UP REPORT ON No-FAULT AuTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCES (1985); Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A Retrospectiue, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1986, at 5.
39. See, e.g., Hellner, Compensation for Personal Injury: The Swedish Alternatiue,
34 AM. J. COMP. L. 613 (1986).
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fit the American or Australian foot. Some European civil law
countries, for example, arguably have done more to bring the
law of accidents within a framework of the social insurance system. One may speculate that the legal, bureaucratic, or administrative culture of those countries facilitated that reform. England is a notable European exception in its failure to adopt tortlaw reform. •0
The common-law tradition exerts a considerable independent
pressure inhibiting reform. Tort law has, at its base, a strong
individualistic, liberal premise that seems to enjoy a broad social
acceptance. 41 Although it is useful to look at reforms in civil law
countries, it may therefore be more enlightening to focus on developments in those countries possessmg a common-law
tradition.
This fact perhaps explains the fascination with the New Zealand reform. Undoubtedly a country strongly in the camp of the
common law, New Zealand has nonetheless adopted a far-reaching reform in abolishing the common law of torts and replacing
it with a right for the victims of accidents to claim from a fund
established by the state.4 2 Much may be gained from an examination of the New Zealand National Compensation Scheme, a
reform that needs even further study. However, some significant
differences may make the reform a less apposite point of comparison. New Zealand is accustomed to planned social experiment; it had established the rudiments of a welfare state well
before most others of the Wes tern world.4 3 Its population is ho40. In the United Kingdom, a commission studying liability and compensation recommended relatively interstitial reform of the common-law system. ROYAL CoMM'N ON
CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY. REPORT, 1978 CMND. 7054.
One insightful way to view the differences between countries is in terms of general
legal societal types-gemeinschaft, gesellschaft, and a third, the bureaucratic-administrative society. See Kamenka & Tay, Social Traditions, Legal Traditions, in LAw AND SoCIAL CONTROL 3, 5, 6-26 (E. Kamenka & A. Tay eds. 1980).
41. See J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) (explicating liberal theory in a
democratic society); P. STARR, SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 240-42
(1982) (suggesting that it was largely the classical liberalism of America that inhibited
the acceptance of significant state involvement in health care, when other western but
less classically liberal states, like Germany, had accepted a state role in the late nineteenth century).
42. See generally, A. BLAIR, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION IN NEw ZEALAND (1978); T. lsoN,
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A COMMENTARY ON THE NEW ZEALAND SCHEME (1980); Brown,
Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 976
(1985); Gaskins, Tort Reform in the Welfare State: The New Zealand Compensation
Act, 18 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 238 (1980).
43. See Tampke, Bismarck's Social Legislation: A Genuine Breakthrough?, in THE
EMERGENCE OF THE WELFARE STATE IN BRITAIN AND GERMANY 1850-1950, at 71, 81-82 (W.
Mommsen ed. 1981).
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mogeneous and well-educated. A politically unitary state with a
strong tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, it has a highly
egalitarian political ethos. Income is relatively evenly distributed. 0 It is not heavily industrialized, having depended largely
upon efficient primary economic activity, especially agriculture.
In most of these respects, New Zealand differs markedly from
the United States and even Australia.
Ironically, comparative models more worthy of attention in
the United States generally have been neglected. Reformers
. should turn to reform suggestions and implementation of these
suggestions in Australia or Canada. Like the United States, both
nations have federal structures. 411 Their populations, although
smaller than the United States, exceed considerably that of New
Zealand. 46 They have experienced significant post-World War II
immigration from Southern and Western Europe and Asia, giving them an ethnic diversity resembling the United States. 47
They have a proportionally large industrial base. Their legal traditions go beyond that of the common law. Both have a tradition
of constitutional government including judicial review of legislative action. 48 Their systems possess formal and informal checks
and balances, inhibiting overreaching legislative action. In other
words, in contrast to New Zealand, and like the United States,
parliamentary sovereignty is confined in Australia and Canada. 49
44. 1 C. TAYLOR & D. JODJCE, WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS:
CROSS-NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES AND RATES OF CHANGE 135 (2d ed. 1983); cf. Ahluwalia, Inequality, Poverty and Development, 3 J. DEV. EcoN. 307 (1976) (surveying income distribution in 60 countries).
45. See generally C. Gilbert, Australian and Canadian Federalism, 1867-1984: A
Study of Judicial Techniques (1986); J. MAGNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA: CASES,
NOTES, AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1985); P. LANE, A MANUAL OF AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (3d ed. 1984); L. ZINES, THE HIGH COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1981).
46. In 1986, Australia was estimated to have a population of 16 million, Canada had a
population of 25.5 million, and New Zealand had a population of 3.26 million. 1 COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR LEADERS YEARBOOK, at 210, 346, 898 (1988) [hereinafter
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD).
47. For comments on the decreasing percentage of persons of British extraction in
Australia and resulting growth in ethnic diversity, see A. BANKS & W. OVERSTREET, PoLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD 514 (1981); COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 46, at
210; Blainey, Australia: A Bird's-Eye View, 114 DAEDALUS, Winter 1985, at 1, 24-26.
48. See supra note 45.
49. We make no attempt to take account of Canadian developments in this Article.
Our task, rather, is to describe Australian initiatives so that experience of reform may be
more accessible to Americans. For discussions of Canadian law, see Hutchinson, Beyond
No Fault, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 755 (1985); Ison, The Politics of Reform in Personal Injury
Compensation, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 385 (1977); McLaren, The Theoretical and Policy
Challenges in Canadian Compensation Law, 23 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 609 (1985);
O'Connell & Tenser, North America's Most Ambitious No-Fault Law: Quebec's Auto
Insurance Act, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917 (1987); Trebilcock, supra note 15. Recently the
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TORT REFORM IN AUSTRALIA

In Australia, tort reformers-parliamentarians and lawyers,
both academic and practicing-have engaged in a robust debate
about desirable measures to alter or reshape the liability system.
This debate alone, with its slightly different presuppositions of
government's role in society, is worthy of consideration in the
United States. But more, the debate has finally precipitated
statutory reform, the outlines and impact of which are highly
relevant in the current debate in the United States. We undertake to describe these matters and give an assessment of the
strengths, weaknesses, and political idiosyncrasies of the Australian developments.
A.

Of the Australian Tort Reform Ship, Its Crew, and
Political Rocks

At the outset, a caveat: In many ways, Americans should find
the Australian initiatives relevant in thinking about the American reform agenda. Legislative action of planned reform, however, does not fit so easily with the American political and economic psyche. The United States was born in the libertarian age
that lionized individual freedom; Australia was born in the
Benthamite age that sanctified rational utilitarian planning. 110 In
this respect, the United States possesses the genes of the eighteenth century, Australia of the nineteenth century. Americans
are leery of legislative intervention; Australians are much more
accepting of it. Compensation schemes thus appear more natural
on the Australian political landscape. In spite of this, the tort
reform drive in the United States has a Benthamite character:
the greater social good is to follow from legislative strictures on
the common law. If Bentham, within this narrow sphere, has
come of age in the United States, we are encouraged to take reformers to a place that Bentham has dominated. If such reform
falters in Australia, it appears much more chimerical in the
United States.
Australian tort law does not face problems of the same degree
as United States tort law. Superficial reasons may be cited.
Province of Ontario has evinced strong interest in implementing the elective no-fault
auto insurance scheme presented in O'Connell & Joost, supra note 24.
50. For an excellent exposition of this heritage, see Collins, Political Ideology in Australia: The Distinctiveness of a Benthamite Society, 114 DAEDALUS, Winter 1985, at 147.
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Strict liability for defective products has never been accepted. 111
Incentives to litigate are suppressed because contingency fees
are unethical, and losing litigants must bear part of the successful party's costs, including attorneys' fees. Juries are relatively
rare; most cases proceed before a single judge. Also, Australian
courts, in contrast to the English and American, have been reluctant to ease the burden of proof of causation. 112 Punitive exemplary damages are available only for intentional torts and
even then only on a finding of contumelious disregard of the
plaintiff's rights. 113 On the cultural level, the vindication of rights
through litigation is not ingrained in Australian attitudes. The
absence of a constitutional bill of rights has dampened the
courts' role in the protection of individual rights. 114 Again in
Benthamite fashion, the courts show a distinct deference to the
legislature in delineating new regimes for protection of rights. 1111
Within this defendant's pleasure dome, at least in relative
terms, how did the demand for tort reform arise? In contrast to
the demand for tort reform in the United States, the demand in
Australia did not arise out of impossibly high insurance premiums or lack of available coverage. It sprang rather from a view
that a more efficient system of compensation would release
funds which could be more equitably spread to the victims of
accidents that inevitably occur in modern industrialized societies. At the same time, the promise of reduced compulsory exactions to fund the scheme evoked more mercenary sympathies.
The post-World War II generation of Australian and English legal scholars proposed these views from an overt social welfare
51. Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 A.C. 562, and Australian Knitting Mills Ltd. v.
Grant, 50 C.L.R. 387 (Aust!. 1933), continue to rule as foundation negligence cases. However, the prospect of legislation imposing strict liability looms. The Australian Law Reform Commission has received a reference from the Attorney General to report on the
desirability of legislative reform for defective products. In the United Kingdom, E.E.C.
guidelines on product liability have obliged reform to a strict liability regime. For comments, see Stapleton, Products Liability Reform-Real or Illusory?, 6 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 392 (1986).
52. For the English view, see supra note 25. For the Australian view, see Tubemakers
of Australia v. Fernandez, 10 A.L.R. 303 (Aust!. 1976).
53. Lamb v. Cotogno, 61 A.L.J.R. 549 (Aust!. 1987); Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons, 117
C.L.R. 118 (Aust!. 1966).
54. See South Australia v. Commonwealth, 65 C.L.R. 373 (Aust!. 1942). But the Australian High Court has construed broadly § 92 of the Australian Constitution on interstate trade so as to protect some interests from state regulatory interference.
55. Australian courts are prepared to utilize existing common law actions to protect
liberty interests. For example, Australian courts have employed the torts of battery, assault, and false imprisonment, but they have been unwilling to manufacture an action to
protect privacy. See Victoria Park Racing & Recreation Grounds v. Taylor, 58 C.L.R. 479
(Aust!. 1937).
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perspective. They perceived the tort system as a mechanism to
provide compensation to accident victims. They then pointed
out its inequity and arbitrariness. 56 Tort law appeared a vestige
of another age, a curious anomaly in the modern welfare state.
In casting it aside, post-World War II reformers focused on the
design of schemes. They assumed that government, as society's
agent of equity, should play the central part. More than in the
United States, those who might have questioned the desirability
of reform risked being branded as antediluvian or, still worse, as
cynical supporters of the interests of trial lawyers and insurance
companies.
The New Zealand scheme emerged from an established South
Seas social laboratory. Australia hailed it as an admirable model.
Those proposing such a scheme totally dominated the intellectual debate of the 1960's and early 1970's. Little coherent defense of the tort system was proffered. Hence the adoption of a
New Zealand-like scheme, perhaps even more ambitious in covering both accidents and illnesses, seemed only to await an Australian federal government with a social welfare sympathy. Indeed, adjustments in tor.ts courses at Australian law schools
anticipated the development.
The Australian Labor Party was elected to government in
1972 with a strong platform of social change including the implementation of a National Compensation Scheme. Sir Owen
Woodhouse, a New Zealand Court of Appeals judge and the
prime architect of the New Zealand Scheme, was invited to head
an Australian inquiry to prepare a comprehensive report and
draft legislation. He and his colleagues prepared a comprehensive report, worthy to this day of close examination. 57
In outline, the "Woodhouse Report" recommended a nationwide scheme for compensating victims of accidents and illnesses.
It argued for abolition of the right to pursue at common law an
action for damages for personal injury. No-fault compensation
was to be paid on a periodic basis, calculated primarily upon the
demonstration of lost earning capacity. Permanently incapacitated employed persons presented the easiest case. They would
receive up to eighty-five percent of their preaccident or sickness
income. Special provisions covered the self-employed, the unemployed, youths, and those performing domestic duties. Although
56.

See P. CANE, ATIYAH's AccmENTS: COMPENSATION AND THE LAW (4th ed. 1987); J.
supra note 12; see also H. LUNTZ, COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION (1975).

FLEMING,
57.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION IN

See generally Franklin, Personal Injury Accidents in New Zealand
and the United States: Some Striking Similarities, 27 STAN. L. REV. 653 (1975).
AUSTRALIA (1974).
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the compensation provisions received the most prominence, the
report also recommended new structures and funding for rehabilitation services and accident prevention.
But for a quirk of Australian parliamentary and constitutional
law and convention, American tort scholars would probably have
had another social experiment to discuss. Like Congress in the
United States, the Australian Parliament is bicameral; legislation must pass both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The House of Representatives, where the government by
definition has a majority, passed legislation adopting the Woodhouse Report. Party discipline ensured the passage of government business by a majority. In the Senate, however, the Labor
government did not enjoy a majority. The opposition shunted
the bill to a Senate Select Committee where it languished, not to
be introduced before November 11, 1975, when the GovernorGeneral, Sir John Kerr, in an extraordinary and controversial
decision, prorogued Parliament without advice of the government. The bill lapsed and was not resuscitated when the opposition Liberal Party coalition handily won government in the ensuing election. 118
Many in Australia continued to carry a torch for tort reform. 119
The Australian Labor Party returned to power in 1983. Its platform included, as an "ultimate objective," "an integrated Commonwealth-State nationwide scheme which ensures speedy compensation at reasonable levels for all persons injured in any kind
of accident."60 This platform embodied a legacy of skepticism
58. For a description of these events, see G. BARWICK, SIR JOHN DID His DUTY (1983);
J. KERR, MATTERS FOR JUDGMENT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1979).
59. A notable proponent was Senator Gareth Evans, who later became Attorney General. Senator Evans had been on the faculty of law at the University of Melbourne
School of Law.
60. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMM'N, 1 ACCIDENT COMPENSATION FINAL REPORT 1: A TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS SCHEME FOR NEW SOUTH WALES 101 (1984). The Labor
Government's platform contained, in part, the following proposals:
It seems apparent that the common law fault principle cannot be eliminated
in all fields overnight. Accordingly, Labor will adopt a step-by-step approach in
which the three major problem areas-motor accidents, industrial accidents, and
'other accidents' (including criminal, sporting and domestic injuries)-are tackled successively rather than all at once.
·
Labor's ultimate objective is to have an integrated Commonwealth-State nationwide scheme which ensures speedy compensation at reasonable levels for all
persons injured in any kind of accident. . ..
As presently contemplated, the proposed Commonwealth-State model will involve successive adoption of the following steps:
(i) no-fault motor accident compensation scheme to be introduced, accompanied by abolition of common law claims arising from such accidents;
(ii) increase workers' compensation benefits under existing statutory system to
match bench-marks set by motor accident scheme;
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about grandiose governmental schemes left by the Whitlam Labor Government of the 1970's and, as a consequence, considered
a more modest and less centralized reform program appropriate.
The government therefore encouraged the states to introduce reforms on a uniform basis. Instead of a full frontal attack on the
tort system and the immediate substitution of a state-run compensation system, the government considered a staggered process more appropriate. Initially, a transport accidents scheme
would displace the common law in that arena. Then, a workplace
accidents scheme would further supplant the common law. Finally, the scheme could be extended to all accidents. The times
for the execution of a uniform cooperative scheme were propitious. All the Australian states with the exception of Queensland
and Tasmania were controlled, in the mid 1980's, by Australian
Labor Party governments.
It should not be assumed that all supporters of the Labor
Party were solidly behind the efforts to reform tort law. Labor
unions in Australia are singularly important in placing their
powerful support behind the Labor Party. But on this issue, the
unions were equivocal and, in some instances, hostile.
A vital raison d'etre for unions remains the aid rendered by
union representatives, through affiliations with law firms, to
union members in obtaining generous compensation for injuries,
often minor injuries. Australia's powerful trade unions feared
that a no-fault scheme would destroy benefits fought for over a
long period by unions. Unions naturally opposed no-fault
schemes to the extent that they dilute the cumulative benefits
under the common law, workers'· compensation legislation, and
industrial awards bargained for separately.
Common-law liability tends to overcompensate the victims of
minor accidents. Insurance companies face heavy costs of investigation and settlement of claims that are reduced by quick and
relatively generous compensation payments for minor injuries. 61
Most union members will suffer minor injuries, and accordingly,
it is very much to the advantage of the union hierarchy to encourage and support this system. 62 The relatively few victims of
more serious accidents will, because of their injury, likely lose
their employment and thus leave the union in any case. Unions
(iii) extend workers' compensation to 24-hour-a-day cover for earners, with
abolition of common law claims;
(iv) 24-hour-a-day cover for non-earner non-road accident victims.
Id.
61. See, e.g., FLORIDA'S TASK FORCE, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS REPORT, supra note 21.
62. 5 N.S.W. PARL. DEB. 797 (1953).
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have secured very generous rights through bargaining, at least
for those suffering less than catastrophic injury. Australian
workers may not always appreciate that those of them injured
on the job enjoy rights, in having recourse both to no-fault and
the common law, that outstrip those of their North American
cousins who find themselves restricted to their no-fault rights.
But it is naive to expect that an epidemic of altruism would infect unions in Australia. The formidable combination of the professional bar and many powerful unions has had a profound influence on the reform process and its eventual product.

B.

Australian Reform

The Australian path to tort reform has been tortuous. The
achievement of a uniform comprehensive scheme along the lines
of the Woodhouse Report remains distant. Some halfway houses
have been reached in the individual states, but not in the order
anticipated in the federal government's platform.
1. New South Wales proposals- The government in the
oldest state of Australia initially proposed to follow the ordained
route in its planning. In 1981, the Attorney General of New
South Wales called on the New South Wales Law Reform Commission to inquire into, report on, and make recommendations
concerning the adoption of a no-fault compensation scheme as a
first step, respecting injuries arising from the use of motor vehicles or other forms of transportation. The commission set forth a
number of reasons to justify the initially limited focus on transport accidents. In that kind of accident:
1) large numbers of victims were involved and injuries
were generally severe;
2) current arrangements failed to give adequate compensation and evoked community criticism;
3) elsewhere in Australia, auto no-fault had been
introduced;
4) liability insurance was growing increasingly more
costly; and
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5) compensation could be made available from the
ready source of funds already financing liability
insurance. 63
The Commission recommended a no-fault transport scheme that
would abolish the common law for transport accidents. Workers'
Compensation legislation existing at that time would remain in
force. The Commission's Report is a very thorough document
that articulates in detail the reasons for, and the structure of, a
no-fault scheme. 64
The crucible of politics, however, produced a different legislative package in 1987. The state legislature adopted a transport
accidents scheme66 along with a revamped workers' compensation scheme. 66 These reforms abolished common-law rights and
remedies for injuries arising under the terms of the legislation. 67
Quite remarkably, however, the Transport Accidents Compensation Act of 1987, entering into force on July 1, 1987, though·
adopting the bulk of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission recommendations, rejected its central plank: The statute
retains fault as the determinant of entitlement to compensation.68 The retention of fault contrasts with the Workers' Compensation reform, which now resembles the American model establishing an exclusive no-fault code.
63. NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM CoMM'N, supra note 60, at 9-10. Point 5 is also
made by Blum & Kalven, Ceilings, Costs, and Compulsion in Auto Compensation Legislation, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 341, 379.
64. See supra note 60.
65. Transport Accidents Compensation Act 1987, No. 101 (N.S.W.).
66. Workers Compensation Act 1987, No. 70 (N.S.W.).
67. Transport Accidents Compensation Act § 40(1):
No right to or claim for damages or compensation or any other benefit (pecuniary or non-pecuniary) shall lie, otherwise than as provided by this Act, against
any person for or in respect of the death of or bodily injury to a person caused
by or arising out of a transport accident occurring on or after 1 July 1987.
Workers Compensation Act § 149(1):
A worker is not entitled to recover damages, otherwise than under this
Act-(a) from the worker's employer; (b) from any person who is vicariously
liable for the acts or omissions of that employer; or (c) from any person for
whose acts or omissions that employer is vicariously liable.
68. Transport Accidents Compensation Act § 31(1):
If an injured person is able to prove, in accordance with the civil law, that
another person is (in the capacity of the owner or driver of a motor vehicle or
other form of transportation or conveyance to which this Act applies) liable, in
whole or in part, for the bodily injury suffered by the injured person, the injured
person is entitled to benefits under this Act.
For commentary, see Phegan, The Scheme in Context-TransCare to TransCover, in
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION SEMINAR: THE NEW TRANSPORT ACCIDENT COMPENSATION
SCHEME (University of Sydney; June 20, 1987) [hereinafter CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION SEMINAR].
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By jettisoning the no-fault concept but adhering to other recommendations, the New South Wales legislation, termed the
"TransCover" Scheme, takes an entirely idiosyncratic course,
destined to subvert its own goals. The scheme provides that, to
make a good claim for compensation, an injured person must
prove "in accordance with the civil law, that another person is
. . . liable, in whole or in part, for the bodily injury suffered by
the injured person. " 69 This determination is not, in the first
place, made by a court. Rather, the Government Insurance Office (GIO) performs this function, in addition to a panoply of
other administrative and supervisory functions. 70 The GIO hears
claims 71 and then has the duty to "advise and assist persons in
the preparation and making of claims for benefits." 72 At the
same time, the GIO must undertake the apparently conflicting
task of investigating the claim, while ensuring that it is "not
dealt with in an adversary manner."73 The GIO also looks to its
fiscal responsibilities in matching income with outgo.
Plainly, determining and supervising entitlements requires
Solomonic wisdom. Indeed, one wonders how the GIO can determine fault, combined with the permissible defense of contributory negligence, 74 without judicial antecedents. Uncertainty will
abound, and an accompanying increase in the cost of claims disposition will result. Transaction costs, the vice visited upon the
common law, will return to stalk the TransCover Scheme.
The TransCover Scheme calculates compensation for wage
loss on the basis of either total or partial disability. Subject to
proof of fault, the Scheme entitles a totally disabled wage earner
to benefits of eighty percent of earnings to a maximum of $500
per week. A partially disabled earner, fit to do at least some
work, is entitled to wage loss benefits calculated at eighty percent of the difference between preaccident or postaccident earn69. Transport Accidents Compensation Act § 31(1). For the contrary recommendation of the Law Reform Commission recommending a no-fault scheme, see NEW SOUTH
WALES LAW REFORM COMM'N, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION WORKING PAPER I: A TRANSPORT
ACCIDENT SCHEME FOR NEW SOUTH WALES x.xxix (1983).
70.

Transport Accidents Compensation Act § 12.

71.

Section 155.

72.

Section 157.

73. Section 158(1)(a)-(b). For criticism see Ferguson, The Presentation of
Claims-The Role of the Legal Profession, in CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION SEMINAR,
supra note 68.
74. Section 37 permits reduction of compensation for loss of earning capacity or compensation in respect of permanent impairment.
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ings, subject to the same maximum of $500 per week.n The GIO
redetermines the extent of disability from time to time. 76
The Scheme requires all hospital, medical, and associated
costs to be paid in full, once again subject to considerations of
fault. 77 Impairment of a physical function may attract a lump
sum payment, 78 calculated on the degree of permanent impairment. A one hundred percent impairment in a person twentyfive years or less of age will yield a lump sum payment of
$120,000. The legislature intended that these determinations be
medically based upon material including the American Medical
Association's "Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment. " 79
This aspect of the Scheme prompts criticism. The use of similar impairment tables in the United States workers' compensation scheme has led to a disproportionate amount of litigation
and expense. 80 The presence of such noneconomic categories is
questionable when viewing the scheme in insurance terms. The
cost of replacing earnings to the level of the prescribed ceiling,
together with medical expenses, including rehabilitation, will be
great. It should not be forgotten that very significant governmental subsidization of health care in Australia may hide the
real cost of the compensation system. The New Zealand Scheme
has managed to suppress rapid apparent increases in compensation and death benefits because, among other reasons, the government's health care system bears the medical costs. In fact,
real hospital and medical costs almost doubled in the first eight
75.
76.

Section 79.
Section 82.
77. Section 47.
78. Section 103.
79. Section 106.
(1) The regulations may make provision for or with respect to the basis on which
the degree of a permanent impairment shall be assessed.
(2) Regulations made for the purposes of subsection (1) may provide for the
adoption, wholly or in part and with or without modification, of(a) the publication entitled "Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment" published by the American Medical Association;
(b) any adaptation of the publication referred to in paragraph (a) by any government department or instrumentality within Australia;
(c) the publication entitled "Guide to the Assessment of Rates of Veterans'
Pensions" prepared by the Commonwealth Repatriation Commission; or
(d) any other standard or set of criteria for assessing the degree of a permanent impairment published by any person other than the GIO.
Id.
80. 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 57.14, 57.15 (1986). See generally M. BERKOWITZ & J. BURTON, PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION (1987).
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years of the New Zealand Scheme's operation; lump sums for
noneconomic loss trebled. 81
Adding on noneconomic recovery to compensation for economic losses may therefore threaten financial viability. Only
careful-and expensive-monitoring will avoid cost escalation.
Significantly, insurance policies involving life, health, and fire
insurance uniformly eschew coverage for noneconomic loss. A
narrow exception is disability insurance; this exception is "narrow" because it makes available only relatively small liquidated
amounts for loss of limbs and other bodily functions. One explanation for such reluctance to reward noneconomic loss relates to
the violation of the principle of indemnity on which insurance
depends for its solvency and integrity. 82 That principle states
that the value of insurance benefits should not exceed the loss to
the insurance payee. Otherwise, the payee is encouraged to incur
the loss. Because psychic loss is so subjective, any attempt to
measure it-even by a so-called objective means based on degree
of disability-can be manipulated by the insurance payee. 83 In
effect, non-liability insurers do not sell coverage for
noneconomic loss because they fear its uncontrollable effects on
claim frequency and accident claim costs. They probably rightly
infer that, in a voluntary market, insurance buyers would not
choose to pay the substantial extra premiums needed to cover
the prospect of such noneconomic loss. 84
Reasons beyond fiscal viability can be identified. Mandatory,
even if small, amounts for noneconomic loss for serious injuries
may be viewed as derisory. They may affront the polity even
more than a candid refusal to pay such amounts at all. 86 The
desire to provide noneconomic compensation is perhaps under81. Woodfield, Insurance, Incentives and the Privatization of Social Welfare, 3
C.I.S. PoL'Y REP. 11 (1987) (the officially estimated cost of private medical treatment in
1986 of $24.5 million was overly sanguine; $98 million was in fact expended); see
Crumpton, An Evaluation of the New Zealand and Victorian Schemes (Aug. 1983) (unpublished seminar given at the University of New South Wales).
82. O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering
in Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 344-48;
see also S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AccmENT LAW 229-31 (1987). Shavell notes
that "insurance coverage is intended mainly to remedy pecuniary needs created by
losses, not to compensate for disability due to losses." Id. at 231.
83. O'Connell, supra note 82, at 343-44.
84. See, e.g., K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY AND PUBLIC
Poucy 14-18 (1986) (discussing general aspects of risk allocation and demand for insurance coverage).
85. O'Connell & Partlett, Accident Compensation Working Papers: A Transport Accident Scheme for New South Wales, in PERSONAL COMPENSATION FOR INJURY, supra
note 29, at 8.
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standable because the scheme is promoted as an equitable replacement of present common-law damages. But its inclusion, in
our view, creates a considerable risk to the long-term financial
viability of the scheme.
The TransCover Scheme includes detailed provisions for
nonearners, 86 for the young, 87 and for the dependents of persons
killed as a result of transport accidents. 88 A medical review panel
hears appeals. 89 Matters not relating to medical assessment are
appealed to the New South Wales District Court. 00
The basic reason for the adoption of this scheme was to contain increasing cost that had begun to induce marked increases
in compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance premium rates.
This scheme purported to control costs. 91 Herein lies the reason
for the retention of fault. 92 Fault provides a sieve for claims, effectively reducing the numbers of successful claims, in turn reducing the apparent cost of the scheme. The cost is "apparent,"
because it seems that the administration costs must rival, and
probably initially surpass, those of the common law. Fault has
survived along with the defense of contributory negligence. In
addition, total exclusion from benefits awaits those who fail to
report accidents or who have incurred the injury in the commission of a crime. 93 Partial exclusion may follow from, among other
things, conviction for a number of offenses under the Motor
Traffic Act 1909, for drunken driving, and for failure to wear a
seat belt. 94
In a similar way, the TransCover Scheme exacerbates litigation costs where substantive rights depend upon definitions of
compensable events. Recall the considerable difficulties in defining the meaning of "the course of employment" in the workers'
compensation field. 05 The task of defining "death of or bodily
injury to a person caused by or arising out of a transport accident"96 will not be as difficult as determining fault. However, the
scheme is partial and does not cover all injury and illness. Incen86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Transport Accidents Compensation Act §§ 51, 68-78.
Section 84.
Sections 123-143.
Sections 180, 184.
Sections 184, 186.

91.

N.S.W. Gov'T INFORMATION SERV., TRANSCOVER: THE NSW TRANSPORT ACCIDENT

3 (1987).
Section 31; see Phegan, supra note 68, at 5.
Sections 34-35.
Section 38.
lA A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 20-29 (1985).
Section 40.
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92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
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tives to litigate will arise to classify the injury circumstances either as governed by the common law or the statutory regime. 97
As witnessed in the American law, the choice will depend on
how the litigant is advantaged. 98
This overview touches the surface of schemes that bristle with
definitional issues calling for legal battle. It is something of a
chimera in our complex rights-accented society to imagine that
the institution of the courts can be completely bypassed, especially if fault remains the talisman. If anything, we may more
realistically expect voluntary arrangements to be more successful than those bureaucratically imposed. 99
2. Victoria and South Australia proposals- In contrast to
the New South Wales approach, Victoria and South Australia
attacked tort reform in reverse order: industrial accident reform
legislation predated motor traffic accident reform legislation.
Both states were motivated by the burdensome cost of insurance
premiums to cover an employer's potential liability. 100 In Australia, in contrast to the United States, the no-fault workers'
compensation schemes did not provide exclusive rights; injured
workers could still have recourse to an action at common law
against an employer. Such a cumbersome workers' compensation
system provoked cries for relief from industry. With heavily labor-intensive industry under severe cost pressures in the 1980's,
these cries echoed down the political corridors. Faltering industry and increasing unemployment rates had immediate political
consequences. The legal academic community, seeing an opportunity to rekindle the reform process that had been stalled for so
long, provided an important pro-reform ally. 101 As a result, both
Victoria and South Australia moved to trim the cost in schemes
97. See R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 303
(1965); 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 65.00-67.29 (1987); Havighurst,
"Medical Adversity Insurance"-Has Its Time Come?, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1233, 1241-43;
O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability, supra note 4, at 501-23 (1976);
Schnidman & Salzler, The Legal Malpractice Dilemma: Will New Standards of Care
Place Professional Liability Insurance Beyond the Reach of the Specialist?, 45 U. CIN.
L. REV. 541, 555 (1976).
98. For example, the courts have bowed to arguments to limit the reach of no-fault
legislation so as not to cover intentionally tortious acts. Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 15 Ohio
St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984); Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacrom Chems., 69 Ohio
St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982). But cf. Streeter v. Sullivan,
509 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1987); Fisher v. Shenandoah Gen. Constr. Co., 498 So. 2d 882 (Fla.
1986); Lawton v. Alpine Engineered Prods., Inc., 498 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1986).
99. O'Connell & Joost, supra note 24; see also supra note 49.
100. OFFICE OF THE PREMIER, WORKCARE: EXPLANATORY NOTES ON VICTORIA'S NEW
APPROACH TO ACCIDENT PREVENTION, REHABILITATION, AND COMPENSATION 3 (1985); SOUTH
AUSTRALIAN PROPOSALS FOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION REFORM (1985).
101. See Fleming, Is There a Future for Tort?, 58 AusTL. L.J. 131 (1984).
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made appropriately palatable for labor union acceptance-a vital strategy because unions cherished the availability of common-law relief. This bias on the part of labor unions has implications for tort reform in the United States.
Both Victoria in 1985102 and South Australia in 1986103 enacted legislation that provides more generous no-fault workplace
benefits than previously applicable, but at the same time, severely curtails resort to the common law. The legislation in Victoria limits an injured worker's tort claim to nonpecuniary damages, except for wrongful death and accidents occurring during
employment involving travel. 10• The South Australian legislation
similarly restricts an injured worker's tort claim to nonpecuniary
damages. These damages, if awarded, must not exceed 1.4
times 1011 the amount payable under the no-fault provision for
compensation of noneconomic loss. 106 This no-fault,
noneconomic amount is calculated according to a schedule that
sets forth a percentage disability taken from a table of maiming
injuries. The maximum recovery allowed under the no-fault
scheme for a disability occurring in 1986 was $60,000. Hence, the
maximum obtainable at common law for such disabilities in 1986
was $84,000. For example, total and incurable paralysis lists at
one hundred percent. Wrongful death is especially treated where
the employee was, or ought to have been, covered by third-party
motor vehicle insurance, and a common-law action without restriction may be brought. 107
The scheme compensates the partially or totally incapacitated
South Australian worker on the basis of weekly payments for
loss of income in the following way: First, if the worker is incapacitated for less than one year, the entitlement will equal the
worker's notional weekly earnings if totally incapacitated. "Notional weekly earnings" are the worker's average weekly earnings
as adjusted by inflation or pay increases. 108 If partially incapacitated, the worker's entitlement equals the difference between
the worker's notional weekly earnings and the weekly earnings
that the worker earns or could earn in suitable substitute employment.109 Second, if the period of incapacity exceeds one
102. Accident Compensation Act, 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, as amended by the Accident
Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1986 Viet. Acts 48.
103. Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, 1986 S. Aust!. Acts 124.
104. Accident Compensation Act, 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 135(1).
105. 1986 S. Aust!. Acts 124, § 54.
106. Section 43.
107. Section 54(2).
108. Section 3.
109. Section 35(1)(a).
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year, the worker is entitled to payments of up to eighty percent
of the worker's notional weekly earnings. If partially incapacitated, the worker's entitlement equals eighty percent of the difference between the worker's notional weekly earnings and the
weekly earnings that the worker earns or could earn in suitable
employment that the worker has a reasonable prospect of
obtaining.
The Victorian legislation entitles, but also limits, a totally incapacitated worker to eighty percent of "pre-injury average
weekly earnings" or $400, whichever is less. 110 The statute
prescribes a minimum payment to protect low income earners. A
partially incapacitated worker is entitled to compensation so
long as an actual or deemed drop in income exists. m In this
case, the worker is entitled to eighty-five percent of the difference between the current weekly earnings and the worker's "preinjury average weekly earnings" or $400, whichever is less. This,
in effect, places a ceiling upon the recovery that an injured
worker may make.
Provisions under both states' legislation exist for administrative review of payments. South Australia's full income replacement for the first twelve months deserves brief comment. This
provision is imprudent because it entrenches an incentive to
claim for minor injuries. If anything, the bias should be reversed
-the catastrophically injured should be favored. Political compromise explains this revision. The unions had negotiated benefits with employers under industrial awards that would establish
in the Australian industrial system a catalog of employment
terms and conditions enforceable through a system of industrial
courts. In other words, deference to the political potency of
union interests explains this provision. It is part of the sugarcoating that, in our view, will ultimately have detrimental consequences for the health of the scheme.
In both Victoria and South Australia, prior to this new legislation, an employer's private insurance policies covered workers'
compensation liability. Both states have placed a portion of the
blame for the cost of the old system on the private insurers. Accordingly, the new legislation eschews the use of private insurers. Instead, an employer in the ordinary case must pay a levy to
a governmental body established pursuant to the legislation.
110. 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 93(4).
111. Section 93(1).
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Employers pay this levy according to a percentage of the aggregate remuneration paid to workers. 112 To some extent, the
legislation recognizes the need to create incentives for safety by
penalizing "dangerous industries" 113 and rewarding safe eIIlployers. m The legislation in Victoria does not allow an increase in
the rate levels before September 1990. m This aspect causes disquiet, because it signals that rate-setting may become a political
pawn instead of a reflection of the riskiness of particular categories of industry. If so, rate-setting would undermine the provisions for safety promotion. 116 The shorter political horizon would
substitute for the longer market-oriented actuarial risk. 117
The legislation in Victoria and South Australia predictably attempts to minimize the participation of the courts. Designated
government officials make determinations of eligibility subject to
internal appeal. 118 Both acts, however, preserve avenues of appeal, limited to questions of law, to their respective supreme
courts. 119
In the motor vehicle accident area, Victoria has recently introduced a no-fault scheme. This scheme replaces and repeals an
earlier no-fault scheme that provided limited add-on no-fault
benefits. 120 The Transport Accident Act of 1986 became effective
January 1, 1987. 121 If a transportation accident subsequent to
that date causes personal injury, the victim may bring an action
at common law only where the injury is defined as "serious."122
The Act provides that the no-fault benefits for total loss of
earnings are either eighty percent of the preaccident weekly
earnings or calculated on a scale of payments determined by
numbers of dependents, whichever is greater. 123 In any event, a
112. 1986 S. Aust!. Acts 124, § 66; 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 187.
113. 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 188(1); 1986 S. Aust!. Acts 124, § 16(9).
114. 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 189(6); 1986 S. Austl. Acts 124, § 67.
115. 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 187(5).
116. See, e.g., 1986 S. Aust!. Acts 124, § 29.
117. Public choice theory properly alerts us to possible shortcomings of discretionary
bureaucratic decision making. See, e.g., G. BRENNAN & J. BucHANAN, THE REASON OF
RULES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (1985); see also S. BREYER, REGULATION AND
ITS REFORM (1982) (discussing problems of regulation and proposed solutions); Peltzman,
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976) (discussing
the influence of special interest groups).
118. See, e.g., Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, 1986 S. Aust!. Acts
124, Part VI (Reviews and Appeals).
119. Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, 1986 S. Aust!. Acts 124, § 69;
Accident Compensation Act, 1985 Viet. Acts 10191, § 68.
120. Motor Accidents Act, 1973 Viet. Acts 8429.
121. Transport Accident Act, 1986 Viet. Acts 111.
122. Section 93.
123. Sections 44(1) & (2).
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weekly payment must not exceed either $430 or one hundred
percent of preaccident earnings. If partial loss of earnings has
occurred, the benefit is eighty-five percent of the difference between the current weekly earnings and preaccident weekly earnings or determined according to a scale by numbers of dependents.12• If a person has suffered a total loss of earnings, the
same upper limit applies-$43O or one hundred percent of lost
earnings. In addition, an injured person who suffers a degree of
impairment of more than ten percent may claim an "impairment
benefit" according to a formula turning upon the degree of impairment, with one hundred percent impairment leading to a
stipulated payment of $40,580. m The injured person may receive this benefit by way either of a lump sum or periodic payment. Detailed and specific provisions cover minors, nonearners,
dependent spouses, surviving children, and others. All monetary
amounts are indexed to inflation based on projected increases in
average weekly earnings. 126 The Act also covers the cost of medical services. 127
Under the Victorian Transport Accident Act, only those suffering "serious injury" have recourse to the common law. Serious
injury is defined as an injury indicating a degree of impairment
of thirty percent or more, including wrongful death. 128 If an action is brought, the Act limits potential damages. Damages for
pecuniary losses and pain and suffering cannot be awarded if the
total assessed for both is less then $20,000. 129 The Act prohibits
recovery of pain and suffering damages exceeding $200,000130
and pecuniary damages in excess of $450,000. 131 It caps total
damages in wrongful death actions at $500,000. 132
The Act allows for appeals from administrative determinations made pursuant to the Act. 133 This scheme, unlike that established under the earlier Accident Compensation Act, centralizes the collection of levies and the payment of compensation in
a governmental body, dubbed the Transport Accident Commis124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Sections 45(1) & (2).
Section 47.
Section 61.
Section 60.
Section 93(3).
Sections 93(7)(a)(i) & (b)(i).
Section 93(7)(b)(ii).
Id.
Section 93(9).
Sections 77-83.
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sion. 134 The Commission also has safety and rehabilitation
functions.
The South Australian legislation, on the other hand, drastically reduces recovery of damages for motor accidents, without
providing attendant no-fault benefits. No damages may be
awarded for noneconomic loss unless the injury significantly impaired the person's ability to lead a normal life for a period of at
least seven days or resulted in medical expenses of at least
$1,000. 1311 This approach, as applied in 1987, awards
noneconomic losses on the statutory formula that produces a
maximum of $60,000. The legislation prohibits damages for
mental or nervous shock, except where the plaintiff was actually
present at the accident or was a parent, spouse, or child of the
victim. 136

C.

Some Lessons

The Australian reforms, like the present American ad hoc reform phenomenon, respond in a shallow way to apparent accident cost increases. They demonstrate little real concern for
those most disadvantaged by accidents-the catastrophically injured. Most obvious are a group of reforms designed to directly
lower damage awards to successful plaintiffs. Two High Court of
Australia decisions fueled damage awards, resulting in increased
third-party premium rates for automobile and workers' compensation.137 In these cases, the High Court exhibited a genuine
concern that damages should be tailored with the goals of tort
law in mind. But the political pressure of a large class of premium payors ignored such arguments. 138
State legislatures reflected more deeply when considering the
schemes discussed above. Nonetheless, political expediency
ruled the day. The shortcomings of the schemes were not thoroughly considered. For example, the schemes adopt a system of
134. See § 12 for a complete list of functions.
135. Wrongs Act Amendment, 1986 S. Austl. Acts 126, § 35. This $1,000 amount
could change.
136. Cf. Jaensch v. Coffey, 155 C.L.R. 549 (Austl. 1984) (extending liability for nervous shock).
137. Tordorovic v. Waller, 150 C.L.R. 402 (Austl. 1981) (setting the applicable discount rate for calculation of loss of future earning capacity and health care costs); Griffiths v. Kerkemeyer, 139 C.L.R. 161 (Austl. 1977) (allowing damages for voluntary nursing services).
138. Schwartz, The Advantages of Tort, in PERSONAL COMPENSATION FOR INJURY,
supra note 29, at 70.
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periodic payments under which accident victims arguably become mendicants of the state. They lose independence and, with
it, a vital incentive to rehabilitation. The low ceilings provided
in the Australian reforms also trench upon the middle class victim who may witness a severe reduction in his circumstances.
Although purchasing insurance may ameliorate this problem, it
seems ironic that a state compensation scheme enacted with the
aim of equitable and adequate compensation for accident victims should stimulate a significant private insurance market. To
be sure, victims of catastrophic injury will have coverage for
long-term medical needs. But if, as is likely, medical costs increase exponentially, then the quality of health care will also
suffer unless national health care funding is radically increased.
In this way, the Australian reforms do not meet the often repeated criticism that the common-law system favors the mildly
over the catastrophically injured. 139 Instead, the Australian reforms compound the sin.
Ideally, a rational inquiry should open the way for consideration of all vying interests, and the weight of good sense and logic
should lead to beneficial reform. The Australian experience gives
pause to those who argue for such an ideal. The report of the
New South Wales Law Reform Commission on a Transport Accident Scheme for New South Wales provides a case study. The
partial adoption of the report's recommendation of a comprehensive no-fault scheme for auto accidents undermined the very
goals of the recommendations. That this befalls reform in
Benthamite Australia indicates that it would occur to a much
greater degree in the United States.
A lesson to be extracted from the Australian experience is that
optimal reform must account for all contending interests. Successful reform may be more realistically achieved if a structure
of rules can be fabricated whereby parties may have more freedom to choose desirable compensation agreements. This approach not only makes reform achievable, but also makes the
reform, once adopted, ·more likely to be acceptable to the community. Keep in mind that if no-fault insurance could be structured to compete side-by-side with tort liability insurance, the
state agency would be compelled to administer efficiently and
keep up-to-date, adequate benefits. 140 In a changing society, we
should beware of legislative reforms that unduly restrict choice
139.
312.
140.

See J.

FLEMING,

supra note 12, at 377; see also P.

See supra note 24.

CANE,

supra note 56, at 291-
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and change. Of all possible choices, an elective no-fault scheme
is more likely, over time, to conform to Professor Keeton's
desiderata. 141
Mindful of our predictions that the Australian legislation possesses flaws, we now set forth an alternative. We are encouraged
that the New South Wales legislation provides for a Review
Committee, signaling that the book of reform is not closed. 142

III. A

PROPOSAL FOR REFORM

An examination of the Australian reform experience may play
a valuable role in the formulation of any proposal for reform.
The controversy between the merits of no-fault versus faultbased compensation schemes raises the possibility of allowing
both types of compensation to compete side-by-side with one
another under elective programs.

A.

An Elective No-Fault Scheme

This Part sets forth contractual and legislative schemes that
may avoid many of the pitfalls of comprehensive state-directed
schemes and of ad hoc short-sighted reform measures. These
schemes of reform would fit both within the United States and
Australia. Indeed, in Australia we speculate that the flaws of the
Victorian, South Australian, and New South Wales legislation
may force some reformulation along the lines suggested. In the
United States, we hope that more mature consideration of tort
reform measures may encourage adoption of the type of measures outlined. Because the no-fault alternative has already been
aired before American legal audiences, 143 this Part concentrates
on how the reform would operate in Australia. Nevertheless, our
discussion is material for American reformers. Its "outside" review and summarization should be instructive in showing how
an elective no-fault system may function.
The proposed elective no-fault reform would allow governments to initiate no-fault changes interstitially and selectively-even electively. The fact that state-owned insurance
141. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
142. Transport Accidents Compensation Act 1987, No. 101 (N.S.W.), §§ 204-205. A
similar review is contemplated under the Workers Compensation Act 1987, No. 70, § 8
(N.S.W.).
143. See supra note 4.
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companies, as authorized insurers, write almost all third-party
personal injury motor vehicle liability insurance in Australia
greatly facilitates an elective form of no-fault insurance at least
for motor accidents. For example, even without enabling legislation, the Government Insurance Office of New South Wales
(GIO) could offer its insured drivers a no-fault motor vehicle
policy calling for no-fault benefits of the type recommended by
the Law Reform Commission. The GIO could pay benefits for
personal injury to insured persons and their relatives residing in
the same household. In return, the insured persons and all their
dependent no-fault beneficiaries would, at the time of purchasing the policy, waive any rights to sue any GIG-insured motor
vehicle driver in tort for personal injury. 144

B.

A Contractual Elective No-Fault Scheme

Because the GIO of New South Wales obtains the benefit of
avoiding payment of tort damages to the no-fault insured drivers
and their relatives under a contract waiving potential tort
claims, these savings could fund the payment of no-fault benefits to no-fault insured persons. The United States' no-fault experience demonstrates that payment of no-fault benefits is, in
gross, much less costly to an insurer than payment of tort damages. Thus, no-fault benefits should cost no more-and probably
substantially less-than tort liability insurance. At whatever
comparative cost, an insured person would have the option of
deciding which form of insurance better suits her needs: no-fault
or fault-based.
A proposal for elective no-fault may come in various forms.
For example, it could expand the spectrum of insurance offerings. The insurer could offer: (1) a no-fault package that adds on
no-fault benefits, with no restraint on suing in tort apart from
·deducting benefits already paid under no-fault; (2) a no-fault
package with benefits comparable to those under the New South
Wales Law Reform Commission's Report, with a concomitant
contractual waiver of tort rights; or (3) regular tort liability
coverage.
144. For a discussion of this proposal, including the issue of how minors could be
bound to the no-fault choice, see O'Connell, Transferring Injured Victims' Tort Rights
to No-Fault Insurers: New "Sole Remedy" Approaches to Cure Liability Insurance Ills,
1977 U. ILL. L.F. 749, 790 n.136. For another elective no-fault auto insurance proposal,
utilizing uninsured motorists coverage, see O'Connell & Joost, supra note 24.
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In the usual motor vehicle accident, passengers and driver
proceed against another insured driver. Rarer cases include actions against parties other than drivers of vehicles. Manufacturers of cars and component parts form a category of possible
third-party defendants. Under the elective no-fault scheme, a
common-law action would lie against these other categories.
Preaccident waivers of tort rights against motorists may encourage a search for other third-party defendants.
We consider encouraging actions against these defendants desirable. Because of greater difficulties in bringing actions against,
for example, manufacturers and road designers, these defendants probably are comparatively unrepresented in today's litigation. Targeting them more frequently as defendants in commonlaw actions may well cause them to invest more heavily in
safety. These defendants are arguably in a better position than
motorists to take the most meaningful safety precautions. 14 ~ Our
scheme has the benefit, not shared by the New South Wales reform, of heightened emphasis on the common law in an area
where it is more likely to fulfill its role of encouraging safety.
A more complex scheme could apply to any insurer, not just
one with a governmental monopoly on automobile coverage, and
could apply to liability for any kind of accident, not just those
involving automobiles. Under this scheme, an insurer could sell
first-party, no-fault coverage for wage and health benefits, while
providing that once the no-fault payment is made, the no-fault
insurer succeeds to the rights of the no-fault beneficiary against
any tortfeasor, including rights to pain and suffering. 146 Unlike
the simple contractual arrangements above, this version of the
scheme is complicated by recondite law relating to assignment of
bare rights of action. 147 "[E]quity did not allow the assignment
of a bare right of action, whether legal or equitable . . . on the
ground that it savoured of or · was likely to lead to
maintenance. " 148
Courts, however, will enforce such an assignment if the con-.
tract of insurance constitutes "a genuine commercial interest" 149
in a chose in action that arises independently of the arrange145. O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 299, 331-70 (1963).
146. O'Connell & Brown, A Canadian Proposal for No-Fault Benefits Financed by
Assignments of Tort Rights, 33 U. TORONTO L.J. 434, 437-39 (1983).
147. Id. at 441-50.
148. Glegg v. Bromley, (1912] 3 K.B. 474, 490 (Parker, J.); see also Trendtex Trading
Corp. v. Credit Suisse, 1982 A.C. 679.
149. Trendtex Trading Corp, 1982 A.C. at 703; see also Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
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ment to maintain the action. 1110 The chose in action-the right of
action-under our scheme is the quid pro quo for the granting of
no-fault compensation rights. It arises independently of any arrangement to maintain the action and hence is enforceable.
Arguably, under a scheme involving assignment of a cause of
action, many insureds could not make a truly informed choice,
at the time of purchasing insurance, between fault and no-fault
insurance, given the complexity of tort law and insurance. The
potential for confusion of insureds may even cause a court to
render such a no-fault choice not binding on an injury victim
who turns out to have a clear case under tort liability. 1111
Australian courts would subject such agreements to close scrutiny. Moreover, they could employ the doctrine of unconscionability as a basis for setting aside contracts. 1112 A court may set
aside a contract at the behest of an underprivileged or misinformed promisor. Factors that may persuade a court to set
aside the contract include a plaintiff's lack of information, a
plaintiff's reliance on a misapprehension brought to the notice of
the defendant, and a plaintiff's inexperience with matters· and
language of a commercial nature.
The Canadian case of Pridmore v. Calvert 1113 is directly relevant to a waiver of rights in the insurance context. In this case,
the plaintiff executed a release of liability in favor of the defendant insurance company soon after an accident. The court set
aside the release on the basis of the doctrine of inequality of
bargaining power. 1114 The court emphasized the unequal information possessed by the parties, especially at a time soon after the
accident before the plaintiff could acquire independent legal advice. 11111 Another case viewing the relationships between insurer
150. R. MEAGHER, W. GUMMOW & J. LEHANE, EQUITY: DOCTRINE AND REMEDIES 694 (2d
ed. 1984).
151. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775, 789-97 (1982); O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability by
Contract-With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 59, 67-72.
152. For Australian doctrine, see Commercial Bank of Aust!. v. Amadio, 57 A.L.R.
358 (Aust!. 1983). For American doctrine, now of some maturity, see Phillips Home Furnishings v. Continental Bank, 231 Pa. Super. 174, 180-82, 331 A.2d 840, 843-44 (1974),
order rev'd, 467 Pa. 43, 354 A.2d 542 (1976); Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J.
359 (1976).
153. 54 D.L.R.3d 133 (1975).
154. Id. at 144; cf. Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
155. Pridmore, 54 D.L.R.3d at 141-44.

478

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 21:3

and insured also emphasized the crucial element of independent
advice. m Australian courts would consider such cases under the
unconscionability doctrine or alternatively, if a relationship were
established and continued, under undue influence. In any event,
independent advice under Australian as well as Canadian law
destroys the basic ingredients of unconscionability and dispels a
presumption of undue influence. 1117
The elective, no-fault scheme of reform, therefore, may well
require the opportunity of independent legal advice. But to provide it to each insurance buyer at the time she buys insurance
would be cumbersome and expensive. In addition, the uncertainties in judicial attitude may dissuade an insurer from this innovative path. 158
Two strategies may circumvent these possible stumbling
blocks. First, given the political will, legislation could authorize
insureds to enter into elective no-fault arrangements of the type
suggested. The legislation could definitively establish guidelines
for the fairness of the election, for example, stipulating the extent and nature of information to convey to the insured. The
legislation could describe the class of persons covered in an insurance policy. It could also provide that the election of a policy
binds those persons and, at the same time, allows them to enforce the no-fault contract against the insurer. The disadvantage
of this strategy lies in the usually cumbersome and, as we have
seen, unpredictable nature of having legislation enacted. 159 Furthermore, such legislation will naturally be viewed as controversial because it may appear, by undermining traditional commonlaw rights, to favor strong insurance companies over weak individual claimants.
Another method, fully consistent with freedom of choice, to
surmount these difficulties could allow the insurer to bind itself
by a preaccident guarantee to tender such no-fault benefits, but
bestow upon the accident victim a postaccident choice to reject
156. Wawanesa Mutual Ins. Co. v. Buchanan, 74 D.L.R.3d 330 (1976).
157. See Commercial Bank of Austl. v. Amadio, 57 A.L.R. 358, 366 (Austl. 1983);
Lloyds Bank v. Bundy, [1975) 1 Q.B. 326, 336-39; National Westminster Bank v. Morgan, [1983) 3 All E.R. 85, 91.
158. O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Personal Injury
Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U.L.
REV. 589, 627-628 (1982); see Veitch, Cosmetic Reform: Periodic Payments and Structured Settlements, 7 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 136, 138-42 (1982); cf. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2337-38 (1987) (upholding the enforceability of an
arbitration clause in a broker/client contract).
159. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
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such benefits and sue in tort. 160 Such a scheme would probably
withstand any judicial scrutiny, because no one loses any common-law rights unless, after the accident, a victim with advice as
to the available rights under tort and no-fault schemes surrenders a fault-based claim in return for no-fault benefits. Consequently, the accident victim could not argue unconscionability of
the contract or unlawful assignment of the cause of action.
This exception, however, raises the possibility of adverse selection against the insurer. If a victim could choose after an accident whether to press a fault-based or a no-fault claim, those
with valid fault-based claims would more likely press them, and
those without fault-based claims would collect no-fault benefits.
As a result, an insurer would not have the benefit of a surrender
of fault-based claims to provide income to pay no-fault benefits.
For this reason, reform along these lines should reserve the obligation to tender no-fault benefits for very serious cases-for example, those with losses of, say, $25,000 or over. Given the
marked preference of most seriously injured victims for certainty of benefits as opposed to the risks of a tort suit, most of
them-even those with a good chance of tort recovery-would
likely prefer immediate, certain no-fault benefits to an uncertain, dilatory tort recovery. For those with serious injuries, the
gamble and delay of proving liability and of having damages reduced by contributory negligence militates in favor of a no-fault
choice. Moreover, those afflicted with serious injuries will recognize that once liability is proved and damages have been
awarded, the possibility of unforeseeable changes in their lives
renders those damages of dubious value when compared with a
flexible periodic payment system tailored to changing needs. 161
A scheme allowing the accident victim a postaccident choice
between fault and no-fault claims will be more expensive than
one providing such a victim with only a preaccident choice. A
preaccident choice allows even victims with small claims who are
generously compensated under the pain and suffering component to have their tort claims foreclosed, thus releasing more
funds to pay no-fault claims. A postaccident choice, on the other
hand, gives those with relatively small claims much less incentive to surrender their tort claims. The rational small claimant,
given the chances of a very generous settlement of his claims,
will engage in the forensic lottery of the tort claim. Allowing this
160. See generally O'Connell, A Neo No-Fault Contract in Lieu of Torts: Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898 (1985).
161. J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, supra note 16, at 126.
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postaccident choice, then, will result in fewer savings from elimination of a multitude of smaller claims with their comparatively
large pain and suffering component.
This elective, no-fault scheme is not novel. The 1978 Report
of the Board of Inquiry into Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation in Victoria urged a variant of the victims' postaccident
election. The Report recommended such an elective device as a
means of compensating for wage loss beyond the two-year wage
loss limit under the former Victoria Motor Vehicle Act. 162 Indeed, Mr. Hanlon, Q.C., counsel in the Victorian inquiry, reiterated such a variant in 1983:
[A]t the end of the period of 104 weeks (or two years) of
payments a person desirous of and eligible for continuation of payments should appear before the Motor Accident Appeal Tribunal and seek an extension of their [sic]
no-fault entitlement. This application, if granted, would
involve the destruction of whatever common law right existed to compensation arising out of the incident which
caused the disability and the person would have to signify to the Motor Accident Appeal Tribunal at the time
of making the selection that was understood and accepted. On the other hand, the issue of proceedings at
common law for damages would by itself destroy all
rights to Motor Accident Board payments in excess of
the existing [no-fault] limit.
This would lead to a situation in which the award of an
unlimited no-fault payment is a replacement of common
law damages . . . . If it meant eventual disuse of the
common law system then that would be at the wish of
the citizens, expressed by the use to which they put the
system, and far more acceptable than the outright destruction of it, in the hope that what one was doing was
better than what one was destroying. It offers also the
capacity to deal with the problems thrown up by the
movements towards change as they arose and in a practical fashion rather than . . . creating the possibility that
one set of problems is eradicated and replaced by another
set equally intractable [under a new scheme replacing
traditional tort law]. This, in my view, would be a far
better way to proceed into the future since it offers the
162.
REPORT

BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION IN VICTORIA,

1111 9.61-.63 (1978).
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advantage of allowing us to make decisions about persons' rights based on our observations of what they,
themselves, value more highly. It does not rely upon the
judgment, however brilliantly informed, of an academic
lawyer or even a politician of the best interests of their
fellow citizens. 163
Also illustrating the acceptability of this idea, workers' compensation legislation in the state of Victoria included, in a different form, an election requirement of this kind up to 1953. 164
Subsequently, legislation gave claimants a right to proceed both
at common law and under the Act. 1611 A number of High Court
decisions describe the problems experienced by the workers'
compensation system, especially up to 1938. 166 The Act was
amended in 1938 to provide for an express election by the claimant. Considering the great concern in Australia relating to the
rising cost of compensation for industrial accidents, 167 it is a propitious time to consider strategies that will lessen the burdens
on employers but remain fair to injured employees. The reason
stated at the time of the 1953 reform, that election imposed a
hardship on a worker, would carry less weight today when the
high costs of the 1953 reform are realized.
Even without legislative intervention, the following strategy
seems feasible. An employer could contractually guarantee a
worker disabled for more than six months the option of trading
his common-law right for a substantial augmentation (say up to
seventy-tive percent of his actual wage loss) of the relatively low
workers' compensation wage loss payment occurring after the
six-month disability period has elapsed. Once again, the fact
that severely injured workers are risk-averse would induce
many-even with arguably valid, but disputable, tort claims-to
opt for the certainty of lesser no-fault payment over the uncertainty of larger tort payment. This strategy avoids the problem
of adverse selection. Such devices may readily extend beyond
163.

Hanlon,

Victorian Motor Accident Board and Common Law Rights,

in CONFER-

ENCE PAPERS: THE COMPENSATION OF MOTOR ACCIDENT VICTIMS IN VICTORIA-A MODEL

45-49 (Law Institute of Victoria 1983).
164. See Workers' Compensation Act 1928 § 12, V V1CT. STAT. 1410-11 (1929).
165. See Workers' Compensation Act 1958 § 63, VIII VICT. STAT. 1083 (1958).
166. See, e.g., O'Connor v. S.P. Bray Ltd., 56 C.L.R. 464 (Aust!. 1937).
167. Numerous reports have reached this conclusion. See COMM. OF ENQUIRY INTO THE
VICTORIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM, REPORT (1984) (the Cooney Report); JOINT

FOR AUSTRALIA?

COMM. OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL AND HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY-WORKERS' COMPENSATION
TASMANIA, Report

(1977);

JUDICIAL ENQUIRY INTO THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT OF

WESTERN AUSTRALIA, REPORT
PENSATION REFORM

(1985).

(1979);

SOUTH AUSTRALIAN PROPOSALS FOR WORKERS' COM-
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the liability of employers and drivers. Reform under workers'
compensation may prompt other classes of persons having a pattern of exposure to liability to seek insurance coverage that
would afford no-fault benefits to those making these types of
claims. These classes may include occupiers of premises, health
care providers, and manufacturers.
The area of school and athletic injuries, exciting some attention in Australia and the United States in recent years, 168 provides another example of innovative coverages bypassing tort liability.169 The rugby scrum, like the American football line, is a
classic injury-producing machine. The senior author has drafted
an insurance contract based on a preaccident commitment to
make a postaccident tender of net economic loss within ninety
days in return for a waiver of tort liability. 17° Forty-eight states
in the United States have adopted this approach for serious high
school athletic injuries, entailing cases where actual medical expenses and wage loss exceed $25,000. 171 The scheme, commencing with the academic year 1983-84, now operates under the auspices of the National Federation of State High School Athletic
Associations. 172 To date, of fifty-nine seriously injured athletes,
fifty-four have accepted no-fault benefits and concomitantly
waived their tort rights.
We admit to a reservation about the universal feasibility of
the scheme suggested. When one moves beyond accidents with
relatively simple causation or from manifestly dangerous activity, such as automobile and most workplace accidents, difficulties loom large in defining the insured event. For example, injuries arising from consumer products, medical treatment, or toxic
substances present such problems. Under a no-fault automobile
insurance policy, the motorist is compensated for injuries "arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle." 173 But to compensate any patient "for conditions
arising in the course of medical treatment" or to compensate any
consumer "for injuries arising from the use of a product" is not
similarly feasible. In medical malpractice cases, for instance, difficulty arises from having to determine whether the patient was
168.
(1980).
169.
170.
171.
172.
current
173.

See, e.g., Luntz, Compensation of Injuries Due to Sport, 54 AusTL. L.J. 588
J. O'CONNELL & C. KELLY, supra note 16, at 137.
Id.
Id. at 137-38.
A similar plan formulated by O'Connell covering claims for injuries from electric
provided by public utilities has been implemented.
See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 500.3105 (1979).
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injured in the course of treatment or whether she suffers from
the condition for which she went to the health care provider in
the first place. After all, the health care provider can hardly be
asked to pay every patient whose condition declines after treatment.17• Similarly, with respect to products it seems unrealistic
to ask a publisher or bookseller to compensate anyone injured
by tripping over a book. 1711 To tax the creation of all risk is imprudent social policy. 176
Nevertheless, the difficulties posed under the suggested
scheme in defining the insurable event are not insuperable.
Granted all the difficulties of turning back to legislation, a modest legislative intervention will overcome the scheme's
difficulties. 177

C.

An Elective Legislative Scheme

Under the latest version of an elective legislative reform, a
provider of goods or services facing a personal injury claim
would have the option of offering a claimant within, say, a maximum of 180 days, periodic payment of the claimant's net economic loss. That would be prompt payment compared to what
the tort system offers. Such payment would cover any further
medical expenses, including rehabilitation and wage loss, not already covered by any other health or disability insurance payable to the claimant. It would also call for a reasonable hourly fee
174. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: A Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
87 (recommending express contractual allocations of risks, within limits). In a recent
article, Epstein opines that no-fault compensation schemes covering all adverse results of
medical treatment are ill-advised. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 1139, 1156 (1987); see also Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of
Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients and Providers, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173 (adopting an express contract model). But cf. VA. CooE ANN.
§§ 38.2-5000-.2-5021 (Supp. 1988) (providing for a no-fault compensation system for
birth-related neurological injuries); Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort
Boundary, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 287 (stating that the contract
model offers a dubious reform).
175. See generally Henderson, The Boundary Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41
Mo. L. REV. 659 (1982).
176. See M. DouGLAS & A. WILAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN EssAY ON THE SELECTION
OF TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982); Wilavsky, No Risk is the Highest
Risk of All, 67 AM. SCIENTIST 32 (1979).
177. See generally H.R. 5400, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 2553 (1984);
Moore & O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical Malpractice Claims by Prompt Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. REV. 1267 (1984); O'Connell, Offers that Can't be Refused: Foreclo-

sure of Personal Injury Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 589, 627-29 (1982).
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for the claimant's lawyer. These benefits are lavish compared to
those under most health insurance policies in the United States;
few health insurance policies, for example, cover costs of
rehabilitation.
The new laws would also provide that, though the claimant
has a choice of whether or not to accept an offer, if the claimant
rejects the offer, he may go to court only subject to certain restrictions. These restrictions may include:
(1) the prescription of a more stringent standard of proof than
the usual civil standard of preponderance of the evidence; 178
(2) the specific authorization of the defendant to offer to finance a second opinion from another lawyer, who cannot be the
plaintiff's trial counsel and who cannot have any financial interest in the plaintiff's case, as to whether rejecting the defendant's
early offer is in the plaintiff's interest; 179
(3) the allowance of recovery of noneconomic losses only if the
plaintiff establishes a "substantial" amount of such damages.
This restriction would limit rejections of the offer to cases where
noneconomic loss, including any punitive damages awarded, exceeds the plaintiff's economic loss. A formula could define "substantial." For instance, a plaintiff could collect noneconomic
damages only if they were at least four times greater than his
economic loss; 180 and
(4) if the plaintiff does not prevail in the subsequent litigation, the requirement that the plaintiff pay the defendant's
costs, including legal fees, incurred after rejection of the offer,
with the plaintiff's counsel who brought the action jointly and
severally liable for this obligation. 181
In contrast to other proposals for tort reform, this approach
strikes a fair balance by requiring that the defendant provide
something in exchange for its stronger shield against liability
and, as a corollary, that the claimant receive something in exchange for giving up the opportunity to pursue litigation. The
proposal thereby preserves the tort rights of those victims who
do not receive the benefit of an offer of settlement. Only a victim
rejecting the offer of payment of net economic loss, properly
178. O'Connell, Jury Trials in Civil Cases?, 58 ILL. B.J. 796, 807-08 (1970).
179. O'Connell, supra note 160, at 909-10.
180. The risk of this approach, of course, is that it might be an incentive for a jury to
increase its findings of the amount of noneconomic loss in order to render effective its
award.
181. For the initial presentation of the latest version of the "early offers" plan, see
O'Connell, Balanced Proposals for Product Liability Reforms, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 317
(1987).
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deemed by society as fair compensation in the typical case, is
restricted with respect to the amount or manner of recovery.
All the elective no-fault schemes discussed above have the advantage of exposing actors to an internalization of the cost of
their activities. If they engage in dangerous activities, they will
face the prospect of larger insurance premiums than safe operators will face. A properly functioning insurance market, within
limits imposed by the costs of pooling risks and information, will
police changes in accident rates. Here lies a distinct relative advantage over the administrative rate-setting under the New
South Wales, South Australian, and Victorian legislation. Ratesetting under the elective no-fault scheme would be governed by
usual commercial and actuarial considerations. These considerations, however, rank with political exigencies in administrative
rate-setting. Although deterrence through the market system
may never be finely calibrated, it provides a viable alternative to
the straitjacket of administrative discretion. Elective no-fault
proposals leave in place one of the common law's greatest advantages-its capacity to generate information about accident-producing activities as they develop and change over time.
Compensation law, however, seeks to achieve other meaningful
objectives not as elusive as deterrence, including administrative
efficiency and loss distribution. No-fault achieves administrative
efficiency because it reduces payment to lawyers, adjusters, and
other third parties in the system. It achieves loss distribution
because it leaves fewer accident victims and their families without resources. If we seek an acceptable amalgam of these goals,
together with felt needs for individual recourse, elective no-fault
has much to commend it. We claim no nirvana. But elective nofault may constitute improvement over the present mayhem 182
in the American tort system and a less bureaucratic road for
Australian endeavors.
CONCLUSION

We have examined various contemporary strategies for addressing the torts crisis. These reforms, as they are normally
called, each spawn their own set of problems. The prevalent
American ad hoc phenomenon of tort reform has a capacity to
182. See Langbein, Comparative Civil Procedure and the Style of Complex Contracts, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 381 (1987) (describing the impact of the complex and unpredictable American litigation process on commercial contracting).
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work great harm to those most deserving of relief and succor.
Yet this mode of reform is the most politically acceptable and
appealing in the United States. 183
Australian experience exhibits a willingness to contemplate
broad systemic and systematic reform. But the actuality brought
about primarily by political compromise, when all interests are
aggressively represented, is far from the ideal. Admittedly, nofault schemes contain flaws. Faith in the administrative process
may open up decision-making to political considerations detrimental to accident victims. From a social welfare viewpoint,
these schemes may palliate without confronting deeper problems
such as wealth loss arising from illness and safety in the workplace and on the road.
'•
It is imperative to move beyond the present reforms. We suggest that both American and Australian tort systems adopt elective no-fault either through contract or legislation. 184
Our suggestions treat accident victims more equitably and relieve defendants of the worst absurdities of the common law. At
the same time, they preserve the market incentive advantages of
a decentralized system. They also are flexible enough to serve
the needs of a dynamic society.
We cannot achieve perfect implementation of Robert Keeton's
desiderata through any institutions run by humans. 1811 But we
should strive to develop schemes that in practical terms will, as
closely as possible, fulfill these ends. The possibilities for change
are abundant, models for reform numerous, interests at play
contentious, and risks of taking incorrect turns significant. Kant
taught us that the "ought" implies "can": 186 We must temper
our judgments about what ought to be done by knowledge of
183. See supra note 21. For a discussion of the differing approaches of encouraging
early offers by defendants and on the coordination of such contractual and statutory
approaches, see O'Connell, Neo-No-Fault Remedies for Medical Injuries: Coordinated
Statutory and Contractual Alternatives, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at
125.
184. It may indeed be imperative for reformers to provide no-fault benefits in order
to preserve tort reform from constitutional law attack. See Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 474 U.S. 892, dismissing appeal from 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr.
368 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that a substantial federal question was
presented in the challenge to California's tort reform legislation on the issue of whether a
compensation scheme should be enacted as a quid pro quo for the replacement of common-law or state-law remedies). For an informative summary of the constitutional issues
see Smith, Medicine and Law: AIDS, Constitutional Challenges to Tort Reform and
Medical Malpractice, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 370 (1988); see also Leavitt, Liability Insurance Crisis: The Regulatory Response, 91 DICK. L. REV. 919 (1987).
185. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
186. See I. KANT, ON THE OLD SAW: THAT MAY BE RIGHT IN THEORY BuT IT WoN'T
WORK IN PRACTICE (E. Ashton trans. 1974).
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what it is possible to do. Tort reform therefore should be informed by sensitive comparative work that weighs political possibilities and prudent policies. If we can share the technical secret of the winged keel on "Australia II," the victorious yacht in
the 1982 America's Cup, we also can benefit from our comparative efforts to improve the lot of the accident victim.

